Clean up CSPRNG support for PHP7

Replace it all with random_bytes(), leave
only MWCryptRand::generateHex() as a convenience helper.

Change-Id: Ic30376a90e66d8f00dab86e7e6466fb3a750b87d
This commit is contained in:
Max Semenik 2018-01-19 14:42:56 -08:00 committed by Krinkle
parent bfb35823d9
commit 9bab7de5f8
15 changed files with 72 additions and 393 deletions

View file

@ -186,6 +186,9 @@ because of Phabricator reports.
* The ApiQueryContributions class has been renamed to ApiQueryUserContribs.
* The XMPInfo, XMPReader, and XMPValidate classes have been deprecated in favor
of the namespaced classes provided by the wikimedia/xmp-reader library.
* Class CryptRand, everything in MWCryptRand except generateHex() and function
MediaWikiServices::getCryptRand() are deprecated, use random_bytes() to
generate cryptographically secure random byte sequences.
=== Other changes in 1.32 ===
* …

View file

@ -539,6 +539,7 @@ class MediaWikiServices extends ServiceContainer {
/**
* @since 1.28
* @deprecated since 1.32, use random_bytes()/random_int()
* @return CryptRand
*/
public function getCryptRand() {

View file

@ -4018,8 +4018,8 @@ class OutputPage extends ContextSource {
}
if ( $this->CSPNonce === null ) {
// XXX It might be expensive to generate randomness
// on every request, on windows.
$rand = MWCryptRand::generate( 15 );
// on every request, on Windows.
$rand = random_bytes( 15 );
$this->CSPNonce = base64_encode( $rand );
}
return $this->CSPNonce;

View file

@ -188,29 +188,8 @@ return [
);
},
'CryptRand' => function ( MediaWikiServices $services ) {
$secretKey = $services->getMainConfig()->get( 'SecretKey' );
return new CryptRand(
[
// To try vary the system information of the state a bit more
// by including the system's hostname into the state
'wfHostname',
// It's mostly worthless but throw the wiki's id into the data
// for a little more variance
'wfWikiID',
// If we have a secret key set then throw it into the state as well
function () use ( $secretKey ) {
return $secretKey ?: '';
}
],
// The config file is likely the most often edited file we know should
// be around so include its stat info into the state.
// The constant with its location will almost always be defined, as
// WebStart.php defines MW_CONFIG_FILE to $IP/LocalSettings.php unless
// being configured with MW_CONFIG_CALLBACK (e.g. the installer).
defined( 'MW_CONFIG_FILE' ) ? [ MW_CONFIG_FILE ] : [],
LoggerFactory::getInstance( 'CryptRand' )
);
'CryptRand' => function () {
return new CryptRand();
},
'CryptHKDF' => function ( MediaWikiServices $services ) {
@ -231,9 +210,7 @@ return [
$cache = ObjectCache::getLocalClusterInstance();
}
return new CryptHKDF( $secret, $config->get( 'HKDFAlgorithm' ),
$cache, $context, $services->getCryptRand()
);
return new CryptHKDF( $secret, $config->get( 'HKDFAlgorithm' ), $cache, $context );
},
'MediaHandlerFactory' => function ( MediaWikiServices $services ) {

View file

@ -1597,23 +1597,11 @@ abstract class Installer {
protected function doGenerateKeys( $keys ) {
$status = Status::newGood();
$strong = true;
foreach ( $keys as $name => $length ) {
$secretKey = MWCryptRand::generateHex( $length, true );
if ( !MWCryptRand::wasStrong() ) {
$strong = false;
}
$secretKey = MWCryptRand::generateHex( $length );
$this->setVar( $name, $secretKey );
}
if ( !$strong ) {
$names = array_keys( $keys );
$names = preg_replace( '/^(.*)$/', '\$$1', $names );
global $wgLang;
$status->warning( 'config-insecure-keys', $wgLang->listToText( $names ), count( $names ) );
}
return $status;
}

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@ -288,7 +288,6 @@
"config-install-interwiki-exists": "<strong>Warning:</strong> The interwiki table seems to already have entries.\nSkipping default list.",
"config-install-stats": "Initializing statistics",
"config-install-keys": "Generating secret keys",
"config-insecure-keys": "<strong>Warning:</strong> {{PLURAL:$2|A secure key|Secure keys}} ($1) generated during installation {{PLURAL:$2|is|are}} not completely safe. Consider changing {{PLURAL:$2|it|them}} manually.",
"config-install-updates": "Prevent running unneeded updates",
"config-install-updates-failed": "<strong>Error:</strong> Inserting update keys into tables failed with the following error: $1",
"config-install-sysop": "Creating administrator user account",

View file

@ -308,7 +308,6 @@
"config-install-interwiki-exists": "Error notice during the installation saying that one of the database tables is already set up, so it's continuing without taking that step.",
"config-install-stats": "*{{msg-mw|Config-install-database}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-tables}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-schema}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-user}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-interwiki}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-stats}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-keys}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-sysop}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-mainpage}}",
"config-install-keys": "*{{msg-mw|Config-install-database}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-tables}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-schema}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-user}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-interwiki}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-stats}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-keys}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-sysop}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-mainpage}}",
"config-insecure-keys": "Parameters:\n* $1 - A list of names of the secret keys that were generated.\n* $2 - the number of items in the list $1, to be used with PLURAL.",
"config-install-updates": "Message indicating that the updatelog table is filled with keys of updates that won't be run when running database updates.\n\nSee also:\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-database}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-tables}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-interwiki}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-stats}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-keys}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-updates}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-schema}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-user}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-sysop}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-mainpage}}",
"config-install-updates-failed": "Used as error message. Parameters:\n* $1 - detailed error message",
"config-install-sysop": "Message indicates that the administrator user account is being created\n\nSee also:\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-database}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-tables}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-schema}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-user}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-interwiki}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-stats}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-keys}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-sysop}}\n*{{msg-mw|Config-install-mainpage}}",

View file

@ -99,22 +99,14 @@ class CryptHKDF {
'whirlpool' => 64,
];
/**
* @var CryptRand
*/
private $cryptRand;
/**
* @param string $secretKeyMaterial
* @param string $algorithm Name of hashing algorithm
* @param BagOStuff $cache
* @param string|array $context Context to mix into HKDF context
* @param CryptRand $cryptRand
* @throws InvalidArgumentException if secret key material is too short
*/
public function __construct( $secretKeyMaterial, $algorithm, BagOStuff $cache, $context,
CryptRand $cryptRand
) {
public function __construct( $secretKeyMaterial, $algorithm, BagOStuff $cache, $context ) {
if ( strlen( $secretKeyMaterial ) < 16 ) {
throw new InvalidArgumentException( "secret was too short." );
}
@ -122,7 +114,6 @@ class CryptHKDF {
$this->algorithm = $algorithm;
$this->cache = $cache;
$this->context = is_array( $context ) ? $context : [ $context ];
$this->cryptRand = $cryptRand;
// To prevent every call from hitting the same memcache server, pick
// from a set of keys to use. mt_rand is only use to pick a random
@ -150,12 +141,12 @@ class CryptHKDF {
$lastSalt = $this->cache->get( $this->cacheKey );
if ( $lastSalt === false ) {
// If we don't have a previous value to use as our salt, we use
// 16 bytes from CryptRand, which will use a small amount of
// 16 bytes from random_bytes(), which will use a small amount of
// entropy from our pool. Note, "XTR may be deterministic or keyed
// via an optional “salt value” (i.e., a non-secret random
// value)..." - http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264.pdf. However, we
// use a strongly random value since we can.
$lastSalt = $this->cryptRand->generate( 16 );
$lastSalt = random_bytes( 16 );
}
// Get a binary string that is hashLen long
$this->salt = hash( $this->algorithm, $lastSalt, true );

View file

@ -23,187 +23,54 @@
* @author Daniel Friesen
* @file
*/
use Psr\Log\LoggerInterface;
/**
* @deprecated since 1.32, use random_bytes()/random_int()
*/
class CryptRand {
/**
* Minimum number of iterations we want to make in our drift calculations.
* @deprecated since 1.32, unused
*/
const MIN_ITERATIONS = 1000;
/**
* Number of milliseconds we want to spend generating each separate byte
* of the final generated bytes.
* This is used in combination with the hash length to determine the duration
* we should spend doing drift calculations.
* @deprecated since 1.32, unused
*/
const MSEC_PER_BYTE = 0.5;
/**
* A boolean indicating whether the previous random generation was done using
* cryptographically strong random number generator or not.
*/
protected $strong = null;
/**
* List of functions to call to generate some random state
*
* @var callable[]
*/
protected $randomFuncs = [];
/**
* List of files to generate some random state from
*
* @var string[]
*/
protected $randomFiles = [];
/**
* @var LoggerInterface
*/
protected $logger;
public function __construct( array $randomFuncs, array $randomFiles, LoggerInterface $logger ) {
$this->randomFuncs = $randomFuncs;
$this->randomFiles = $randomFiles;
$this->logger = $logger;
}
/**
* Initialize an initial random state based off of whatever we can find
*
* @deprecated since 1.32, unused and does nothing
*
* @return string
*/
protected function initialRandomState() {
// $_SERVER contains a variety of unstable user and system specific information
// It'll vary a little with each page, and vary even more with separate users
// It'll also vary slightly across different machines
$state = serialize( $_SERVER );
// Try to gather a little entropy from the different php rand sources
$state .= rand() . uniqid( mt_rand(), true );
// Include some information about the filesystem's current state in the random state
$files = $this->randomFiles;
// We know this file is here so grab some info about ourselves
$files[] = __FILE__;
// We must also have a parent folder, and with the usual file structure, a grandparent
$files[] = __DIR__;
$files[] = dirname( __DIR__ );
foreach ( $files as $file ) {
Wikimedia\suppressWarnings();
$stat = stat( $file );
Wikimedia\restoreWarnings();
if ( $stat ) {
// stat() duplicates data into numeric and string keys so kill off all the numeric ones
foreach ( $stat as $k => $v ) {
if ( is_numeric( $k ) ) {
unset( $k );
}
}
// The absolute filename itself will differ from install to install so don't leave it out
$path = realpath( $file );
if ( $path !== false ) {
$state .= $path;
} else {
$state .= $file;
}
$state .= implode( '', $stat );
} else {
// The fact that the file isn't there is worth at least a
// minuscule amount of entropy.
$state .= '0';
}
}
// Try and make this a little more unstable by including the varying process
// id of the php process we are running inside of if we are able to access it
if ( function_exists( 'getmypid' ) ) {
$state .= getmypid();
}
// If available try to increase the instability of the data by throwing in
// the precise amount of memory that we happen to be using at the moment.
if ( function_exists( 'memory_get_usage' ) ) {
$state .= memory_get_usage( true );
}
foreach ( $this->randomFuncs as $randomFunc ) {
$state .= call_user_func( $randomFunc );
}
return $state;
return '';
}
/**
* Randomly hash data while mixing in clock drift data for randomness
*
* @deprecated since 1.32, unused and does nothing
*
* @param string $data The data to randomly hash.
* @return string The hashed bytes
* @author Tim Starling
*/
protected function driftHash( $data ) {
// Minimum number of iterations (to avoid slow operations causing the
// loop to gather little entropy)
$minIterations = self::MIN_ITERATIONS;
// Duration of time to spend doing calculations (in seconds)
$duration = ( self::MSEC_PER_BYTE / 1000 ) * MWCryptHash::hashLength();
// Create a buffer to use to trigger memory operations
$bufLength = 10000000;
$buffer = str_repeat( ' ', $bufLength );
$bufPos = 0;
// Iterate for $duration seconds or at least $minIterations number of iterations
$iterations = 0;
$startTime = microtime( true );
$currentTime = $startTime;
while ( $iterations < $minIterations || $currentTime - $startTime < $duration ) {
// Trigger some memory writing to trigger some bus activity
// This may create variance in the time between iterations
$bufPos = ( $bufPos + 13 ) % $bufLength;
$buffer[$bufPos] = ' ';
// Add the drift between this iteration and the last in as entropy
$nextTime = microtime( true );
$delta = (int)( ( $nextTime - $currentTime ) * 1000000 );
$data .= $delta;
// Every 100 iterations hash the data and entropy
if ( $iterations % 100 === 0 ) {
$data = sha1( $data );
}
$currentTime = $nextTime;
$iterations++;
}
$timeTaken = $currentTime - $startTime;
$data = MWCryptHash::hash( $data );
$this->logger->debug( "Clock drift calculation " .
"(time-taken=" . ( $timeTaken * 1000 ) . "ms, " .
"iterations=$iterations, " .
"time-per-iteration=" . ( $timeTaken / $iterations * 1e6 ) . "us)" );
return $data;
return '';
}
/**
* Return a rolling random state initially build using data from unstable sources
*
* @deprecated since 1.32, unused and does nothing
*
* @return string A new weak random state
*/
protected function randomState() {
static $state = null;
if ( is_null( $state ) ) {
// Initialize the state with whatever unstable data we can find
// It's important that this data is hashed right afterwards to prevent
// it from being leaked into the output stream
$state = MWCryptHash::hash( $this->initialRandomState() );
}
// Generate a new random state based on the initial random state or previous
// random state by combining it with clock drift
$state = $this->driftHash( $state );
return $state;
return '';
}
/**
@ -211,191 +78,36 @@ class CryptRand {
* random bytes generation in the previously run generate* call
* was cryptographically strong.
*
* @return bool Returns true if the source was strong, false if not.
* @deprecated since 1.32, always returns true
*
* @return bool Always true
*/
public function wasStrong() {
if ( is_null( $this->strong ) ) {
throw new RuntimeException( __METHOD__ . ' called before generation of random data' );
}
return $this->strong;
return true;
}
/**
* Generate a run of (ideally) cryptographically random data and return
* Generate a run of cryptographically random data and return
* it in raw binary form.
* You can use CryptRand::wasStrong() if you wish to know if the source used
* was cryptographically strong.
*
* @param int $bytes The number of bytes of random data to generate
* @param bool $forceStrong Pass true if you want generate to prefer cryptographically
* strong sources of entropy even if reading from them may steal
* more entropy from the system than optimal.
* @return string Raw binary random data
*/
public function generate( $bytes, $forceStrong = false ) {
public function generate( $bytes ) {
$bytes = floor( $bytes );
static $buffer = '';
if ( is_null( $this->strong ) ) {
// Set strength to false initially until we know what source data is coming from
$this->strong = true;
}
if ( strlen( $buffer ) < $bytes ) {
// If available make use of PHP 7's random_bytes
// On Linux, getrandom syscall will be used if available.
// On Windows CryptGenRandom will always be used
// On other platforms, /dev/urandom will be used.
// Avoids polyfills from before php 7.0
// All error situations will throw Exceptions and or Errors
if ( PHP_VERSION_ID >= 70000
|| ( defined( 'HHVM_VERSION_ID' ) && HHVM_VERSION_ID >= 31101 )
) {
$rem = $bytes - strlen( $buffer );
$buffer .= random_bytes( $rem );
}
if ( strlen( $buffer ) >= $bytes ) {
$this->strong = true;
}
}
if ( strlen( $buffer ) < $bytes && function_exists( 'mcrypt_create_iv' ) ) {
// If available make use of mcrypt_create_iv URANDOM source to generate randomness
// On unix-like systems this reads from /dev/urandom but does it without any buffering
// and bypasses openbasedir restrictions, so it's preferable to reading directly
// On Windows starting in PHP 5.3.0 Windows' native CryptGenRandom is used to generate
// entropy so this is also preferable to just trying to read urandom because it may work
// on Windows systems as well.
$rem = $bytes - strlen( $buffer );
$iv = mcrypt_create_iv( $rem, MCRYPT_DEV_URANDOM );
if ( $iv === false ) {
$this->logger->debug( "mcrypt_create_iv returned false." );
} else {
$buffer .= $iv;
$this->logger->debug( "mcrypt_create_iv generated " . strlen( $iv ) .
" bytes of randomness." );
}
}
if ( strlen( $buffer ) < $bytes && function_exists( 'openssl_random_pseudo_bytes' ) ) {
$rem = $bytes - strlen( $buffer );
$openssl_strong = false;
$openssl_bytes = openssl_random_pseudo_bytes( $rem, $openssl_strong );
if ( $openssl_bytes === false ) {
$this->logger->debug( "openssl_random_pseudo_bytes returned false." );
} else {
$buffer .= $openssl_bytes;
$this->logger->debug( "openssl_random_pseudo_bytes generated " .
strlen( $openssl_bytes ) . " bytes of " .
( $openssl_strong ? "strong" : "weak" ) . " randomness." );
}
if ( strlen( $buffer ) >= $bytes ) {
// openssl tells us if the random source was strong, if some of our data was generated
// using it use it's say on whether the randomness is strong
$this->strong = !!$openssl_strong;
}
}
// Only read from urandom if we can control the buffer size or were passed forceStrong
if ( strlen( $buffer ) < $bytes &&
( function_exists( 'stream_set_read_buffer' ) || $forceStrong )
) {
$rem = $bytes - strlen( $buffer );
if ( !function_exists( 'stream_set_read_buffer' ) && $forceStrong ) {
$this->logger->debug( "Was forced to read from /dev/urandom " .
"without control over the buffer size." );
}
// /dev/urandom is generally considered the best possible commonly
// available random source, and is available on most *nix systems.
Wikimedia\suppressWarnings();
$urandom = fopen( "/dev/urandom", "rb" );
Wikimedia\restoreWarnings();
// Attempt to read all our random data from urandom
// php's fread always does buffered reads based on the stream's chunk_size
// so in reality it will usually read more than the amount of data we're
// asked for and not storing that risks depleting the system's random pool.
// If stream_set_read_buffer is available set the chunk_size to the amount
// of data we need. Otherwise read 8k, php's default chunk_size.
if ( $urandom ) {
// php's default chunk_size is 8k
$chunk_size = 1024 * 8;
if ( function_exists( 'stream_set_read_buffer' ) ) {
// If possible set the chunk_size to the amount of data we need
stream_set_read_buffer( $urandom, $rem );
$chunk_size = $rem;
}
$random_bytes = fread( $urandom, max( $chunk_size, $rem ) );
$buffer .= $random_bytes;
fclose( $urandom );
$this->logger->debug( "/dev/urandom generated " . strlen( $random_bytes ) .
" bytes of randomness." );
if ( strlen( $buffer ) >= $bytes ) {
// urandom is always strong, set to true if all our data was generated using it
$this->strong = true;
}
} else {
$this->logger->debug( "/dev/urandom could not be opened." );
}
}
// If we cannot use or generate enough data from a secure source
// use this loop to generate a good set of pseudo random data.
// This works by initializing a random state using a pile of unstable data
// and continually shoving it through a hash along with a variable salt.
// We hash the random state with more salt to avoid the state from leaking
// out and being used to predict the /randomness/ that follows.
if ( strlen( $buffer ) < $bytes ) {
$this->logger->debug( __METHOD__ .
": Falling back to using a pseudo random state to generate randomness." );
}
while ( strlen( $buffer ) < $bytes ) {
$buffer .= MWCryptHash::hmac( $this->randomState(), strval( mt_rand() ) );
// This code is never really cryptographically strong, if we use it
// at all, then set strong to false.
$this->strong = false;
}
// Once the buffer has been filled up with enough random data to fulfill
// the request shift off enough data to handle the request and leave the
// unused portion left inside the buffer for the next request for random data
$generated = substr( $buffer, 0, $bytes );
$buffer = substr( $buffer, $bytes );
$this->logger->debug( strlen( $buffer ) .
" bytes of randomness leftover in the buffer." );
return $generated;
return random_bytes( $bytes );
}
/**
* Generate a run of (ideally) cryptographically random data and return
* Generate a run of cryptographically random data and return
* it in hexadecimal string format.
* You can use CryptRand::wasStrong() if you wish to know if the source used
* was cryptographically strong.
*
* @param int $chars The number of hex chars of random data to generate
* @param bool $forceStrong Pass true if you want generate to prefer cryptographically
* strong sources of entropy even if reading from them may steal
* more entropy from the system than optimal.
* @return string Hexadecimal random data
*/
public function generateHex( $chars, $forceStrong = false ) {
// hex strings are 2x the length of raw binary so we divide the length in half
// odd numbers will result in a .5 that leads the generate() being 1 character
// short, so we use ceil() to ensure that we always have enough bytes
$bytes = ceil( $chars / 2 );
// Generate the data and then convert it to a hex string
$hex = bin2hex( $this->generate( $bytes, $forceStrong ) );
// A bit of paranoia here, the caller asked for a specific length of string
// here, and it's possible (eg when given an odd number) that we may actually
// have at least 1 char more than they asked for. Just in case they made this
// call intending to insert it into a database that does truncation we don't
// want to give them too much and end up with their database and their live
// code having two different values because part of what we gave them is truncated
// hence, we strip out any run of characters longer than what we were asked for.
return substr( $hex, 0, $chars );
public function generateHex( $chars ) {
return MWCryptRand::generateHex( $chars );
}
}

View file

@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ class BcryptPassword extends ParameterizedPassword {
// Replace + with ., because bcrypt uses a non-MIME base64 format
strtr(
// Random base64 encoded string
base64_encode( MWCryptRand::generate( 16, true ) ),
base64_encode( random_bytes( 16 ) ),
'+', '.'
),
0, 22

View file

@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ class EncryptedPassword extends ParameterizedPassword {
if ( count( $this->args ) ) {
$iv = base64_decode( $this->args[0] );
} else {
$iv = MWCryptRand::generate( openssl_cipher_iv_length( $this->params['cipher'] ), true );
$iv = random_bytes( openssl_cipher_iv_length( $this->params['cipher'] ) );
}
$this->hash = openssl_encrypt(
@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ class EncryptedPassword extends ParameterizedPassword {
$this->params = $this->getDefaultParams();
// Check the key size with the new params
$iv = MWCryptRand::generate( openssl_cipher_iv_length( $this->params['cipher'] ), true );
$iv = random_bytes( openssl_cipher_iv_length( $this->params['cipher'] ) );
$this->hash = openssl_encrypt(
$underlyingHash,
$this->params['cipher'],

View file

@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ class Pbkdf2Password extends ParameterizedPassword {
public function crypt( $password ) {
if ( count( $this->args ) == 0 ) {
$this->args[] = base64_encode( MWCryptRand::generate( 16, true ) );
$this->args[] = base64_encode( random_bytes( 16 ) );
}
if ( $this->shouldUseHashExtension() ) {

View file

@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ final class Session implements \Countable, \Iterator, \ArrayAccess {
// Encrypt
// @todo: import a pure-PHP library for AES instead of doing $wgSessionInsecureSecrets
$iv = \MWCryptRand::generate( 16, true );
$iv = random_bytes( 16 );
$algorithm = self::getEncryptionAlgorithm();
switch ( $algorithm[0] ) {
case 'openssl':

View file

@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ use MediaWiki\MediaWikiServices;
class MWCryptRand {
/**
* @deprecated since 1.32
* @return CryptRand
*/
protected static function singleton() {
@ -39,41 +40,49 @@ class MWCryptRand {
* random bytes generation in the previously run generate* call
* was cryptographically strong.
*
* @return bool Returns true if the source was strong, false if not.
* @deprecated since 1.32, always returns true
*
* @return bool Always true
*/
public static function wasStrong() {
return self::singleton()->wasStrong();
return true;
}
/**
* Generate a run of (ideally) cryptographically random data and return
* Generate a run of cryptographically random data and return
* it in raw binary form.
* You can use MWCryptRand::wasStrong() if you wish to know if the source used
* was cryptographically strong.
*
* @deprecated since 1.32, use random_bytes()
*
* @param int $bytes The number of bytes of random data to generate
* @param bool $forceStrong Pass true if you want generate to prefer cryptographically
* strong sources of entropy even if reading from them may steal
* more entropy from the system than optimal.
* @return string Raw binary random data
*/
public static function generate( $bytes, $forceStrong = false ) {
return self::singleton()->generate( $bytes, $forceStrong );
public static function generate( $bytes ) {
return random_bytes( floor( $bytes ) );
}
/**
* Generate a run of (ideally) cryptographically random data and return
* Generate a run of cryptographically random data and return
* it in hexadecimal string format.
* You can use MWCryptRand::wasStrong() if you wish to know if the source used
* was cryptographically strong.
*
* @param int $chars The number of hex chars of random data to generate
* @param bool $forceStrong Pass true if you want generate to prefer cryptographically
* strong sources of entropy even if reading from them may steal
* more entropy from the system than optimal.
* @return string Hexadecimal random data
*/
public static function generateHex( $chars, $forceStrong = false ) {
return self::singleton()->generateHex( $chars, $forceStrong );
public static function generateHex( $chars ) {
// hex strings are 2x the length of raw binary so we divide the length in half
// odd numbers will result in a .5 that leads the generate() being 1 character
// short, so we use ceil() to ensure that we always have enough bytes
$bytes = ceil( $chars / 2 );
// Generate the data and then convert it to a hex string
$hex = bin2hex( random_bytes( $bytes ) );
// A bit of paranoia here, the caller asked for a specific length of string
// here, and it's possible (eg when given an odd number) that we may actually
// have at least 1 char more than they asked for. Just in case they made this
// call intending to insert it into a database that does truncation we don't
// want to give them too much and end up with their database and their live
// code having two different values because part of what we gave them is truncated
// hence, we strip out any run of characters longer than what we were asked for.
return substr( $hex, 0, $chars );
}
}

View file

@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ class SessionTest extends MediaWikiTestCase {
$logger->clearBuffer();
// Unserializable data
$iv = \MWCryptRand::generate( 16, true );
$iv = random_bytes( 16 );
list( $encKey, $hmacKey ) = TestingAccessWrapper::newFromObject( $session )->getSecretKeys();
$ciphertext = openssl_encrypt( 'foobar', 'aes-256-ctr', $encKey, OPENSSL_RAW_DATA, $iv );
$sealed = base64_encode( $iv ) . '.' . base64_encode( $ciphertext );