This changeset implements T89432 and related tickets and is based on exploration
done at the Prague Hackathon. The goal is to identify tests in MediaWiki core
that can be run without having to install & configure MediaWiki and its dependencies,
and provide a way to execute these tests via the standard phpunit entry point,
allowing for faster development and integration with existing tooling like IDEs.
The initial set of tests that met these criteria were identified using the work Amir did in
I88822667693d9e00ac3d4639c87bc24e5083e5e8. These tests were then moved into a new subdirectory
under phpunit/ and organized into a separate test suite. The environment for this suite
is set up via a PHPUnit bootstrap file without a custom entry point.
You can execute these tests by running:
$ vendor/bin/phpunit -d memory_limit=512M -c tests/phpunit/unit-tests.xml
Bug: T89432
Bug: T87781
Bug: T84948
Change-Id: Iad01033a0548afd4d2a6f2c1ef6fcc9debf72c0d
Clean up use of @codingStandardsIgnore
- @codingStandardsIgnoreFile -> phpcs:ignoreFile
- @codingStandardsIgnoreLine -> phpcs:ignore
- @codingStandardsIgnoreStart -> phpcs:disable
- @codingStandardsIgnoreEnd -> phpcs:enable
For phpcs:disable always the necessary sniffs are provided.
Some start/end pairs are changed to line ignore
Change-Id: I92ef235849bcc349c69e53504e664a155dd162c8
NO_EXECVE doesn't work because limit.sh needs to execute the main
command, and does so through the execve syscall. Eventually we should be
able to replace limit.sh with firejail functionality entirely (T179021),
but in the meantime we can run firejail inside limit.sh.
We also need to stop firejail from running the command in a bash shell
via --shell=none, since that shell would also use the execve syscall.
Bug: T182489
Change-Id: I3fc8ad2f9e5eb5bf13b49d0bccd6094668a5ec55
Most secret information like database passwords are kept in LocalSettings.php,
so blacklisting that file by default would take away a lot of information an
attacker would want.
Since most commands shouldn't need to read the PHP configuration, add it to
RESTRICT_DEFAULT. People can still use:
$cmd->restrict( Shell::RESTRICT_DEFAULT & ~Shell::NO_LOCALSETTINGS );
if they need to still access LocalSettings.php
Bug: T182484
Change-Id: I4032e2706e808e9b819e92a06eff536ccf043388
Introduces a FirejailCommand class, which can be used to add additional
restrictions to a command, for increased security. For now, firejail
containment needs to be enabled on a per-command basis.
The following restrictions are implemented:
* NO_ROOT - disallows any root access, including via setuid binaries
* SECCOMP - block dangerous syscalls with seccomp
* PRIVATE_DEV - create a private /dev
* NO_NETWORK - deny all network access
* NO_EXECVE - block the execve syscall
A convenient Shell::RESTRICT_DEFAULT is equivalent to NO_ROOT | SECCOMP
| PRIVATE_DEV, with the expectation that more restrictions may be added
to it in the future.
In addition, specific paths can be whitelisted with
Command::whitelistPaths(). Any file/directory that isn't whitelisted in
that top level directory (e.g. /srv) won't exist inside the firejail.
$wgShellRestrictionMethod can be set to false for no restriction system,
'firejail' to explicitly use it, or 'autodetect' to autodetect whatever
system is available. In the future the default should be changed to
autodetection once firejail is tested more.
Bug: T173370
Change-Id: Id74df0dbba40e1e7c07c4368aacffb6eb06a17c5
